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RECENT CASES
Communications-Federal Communications Commission's Ruling
on Consideration in "Giveaway" Broadcasts--After extended hear-
ings, the Federal Communications Commission issued regulations declar-
ing that after October 1, 1949, broadcast licenses or renewals would
be refused applicants who proposed to permit the broadcast of speci-
fied types of "giveaway shows." The ban applies to any program in
which the winner of a prize must listen to the program or must purchase
or possess the product advertised.' The Commission insists that these
programs are lotteries within the meaning of § 316 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, which prohibits the broadcast of "any advertisement
of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,
offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance." 2 In re
Promulgation of Rules Governing Broadcast of Lottery Information,
F. C. C. Docket No. 9113, August 19, 1949.
All definitions agree that the three elements of a lottery are prize,
chance, and consideration.3 However, the kind of consideration required
is disputed. 4 No court has ever decided whether radio "giveaways" in-
clude a sufficient consideration to come within the statutory ban, and the
most closely analogous cases-the theatre "bank nights"-disclose a marked
lack of uniformity.5 Yet there are two points on which most courts agree.
First, unless a given scheme is an attempt to evade the law,6 lottery statutes
are inapplicable where no valuable consideration passes.7  Second, the
amount of consideration required for a lottery is more substantial than
that necessary for a contract.8 If these same standards be applied to radio,
the Commission's interpretation seems to be erroneous. It proposes not
only to ban schemes involving mere technical consideration, such as the
requirement of answering the telephone with a given phrase, but also to
prohibit a program which demands only that the participant possess the
product advertised at the time of the call. The latter would probably
not be valid consideration to support a contract, yet the FCC claims it is
sufficient for a lottery.9
1. A temporary restraining order issued September 13, 1949, enjoins enforcement
of the new rules until legality is established, in a suit brought by a Chicago broad-
caster. Similar suits have been filed in a Statutory Court in the Southern District
of New York. Philadelphia Bulletin, September 14, 1949, p. 2, col. 8.
2. 48 STAT. 1088 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 1304 (1948).
3. Post Publishing Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773 (1st Cir. 1916) ; 2 SocoLow, LAW
OF RADIO BROADCASTING § 501 (1939) ; BLACK, LAW DicT. 1134 (3rd ed. 1933).
4. Affiliated Enterprises v. Waller, 1 Terry 28, 5 A. 2d 257 (Del. 1939) (con-
sideration might be money "or a more technical form") ; Griffith Amusement Co. v.
Morgan, 98 S. W. 2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (consideration must be "paid by the
chance holder for the chance").
5. Compare State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608 (1936) with State
v. Fox Beatrice Theatre Corp., 133 Neb. 392, 275 N. W. 605 (1937).
6. Principally those schemes requiring the winner to claim the prize within a very
few minutes; e. g., State v. Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 144 Kan. 687, 62 P. 2d 929
(1936); State v. Lynch, 192 Okla. 497, 137 P. 2d 949 (1943).
7. State v. Hundling, supra, Note that in lottery decisions, and herein, the term
"valuable consideration" is used to refer to a consideration of clear economic value;
the contractual concept of "valuable consideration" as any consideration sufficient to
make a promise enforceable appears in the lottery cases as "technical consideration."
8. Dorman v. Publix-Saenger-Sparks Theatres, Inc., 135 Fla. 284, 184 So. 886
(1938) ; Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc. 491, 293 N. Y. Supp.
745 (N. Y. City Cts. 1937). Contra: Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242
(1931).
9. Proposed interpretative rules, §§ 3.192, 3.292, 3.692, (b) (4) and (b) (1).
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The purposes of the lottery statutes are to discourage gambling '0
and to protect the public from being defrauded in exchange for a chance
at something which may or may not be worth more than their invest-
ment."' These purposes are carried out by the requirement of valuable
consideration. The FCC would add a third, viz., to prevent advertisers
from using public property for private ends contrary to the public inter-
est.12 Its argument is that any other interpretation fails to take account
of the economics of broadcasting, which render paid attendance impos-
sible, and the bank night schemes valueless to the advertiser. It is true
that there is no consistency in a policy which prohibits prizes awarded
only to patrons of a theatre without placing similar strictures on awards
restricted to patrons of a radio program. But the Commission has pointed
out this inconsistency before, and Congress has failed to resolve it.' s Hence
the evidence indicates that Congress did not intend to include giveaways
in the lottery provisions of the Communications Act. The FCC may not
"believe" that Congress intended to proscribe only schemes designed for
other media than radio; '4 but this disbelief, by itself, is not enough to
carry the burden of proving the contrary. If the legal meaning of the term
lottery is to be broadened, the proponents of the change must prove to
the courts the necessity for any expansion of generally accepted legal prin-
ciples and definitions. Until that proof is established, the peculiarities of
the medium of radio make the lottery statute in most cases an inefficient
tool for controlling giveaway programs.
Congressional Committee Hearings-Impeachment of an Official
Record at a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding-Petitioner was in-
dicted for committing perjury ' before a committee of the House of Rep-
resentatives. At trial the jury was charged that if a quorum were re-
corded at the commencement of the meeting in question, and subsequently
certain members left, objection to the competency of the tribunal could
only be raised at that time. Conviction in the district court was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals,2 but reversed by the Supreme Court, which held
(four justices dissenting) that absence of a quorum at the crucial time
could be raised at the trial. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U. S. 84
(1949).
10. See Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168 (U. S. 1850); Yellow-Stone Kit v.
State, 88 Ala. 196, 200, 7 So. 338, 339 (1890).
11. Affiliated Enterprises v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Co., 23 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. Ill. 1937).
See Note, 48 A. L. R. 1115, 1116 (1927).
12. 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), 47 U. S. C. 301 (1948) (declaring radio channels pub-
lic property).
13. See letter of FCC Chairman James Lawrence Fly to the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, dated Dec. 30, 1943, stating that "Under the present § 316
of the Communications Act, the Commission has been unable to deal adequately with
the problem [of giveaways]" and proposing remedial legislation. Hearings before
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 991
(1944). The Department of Justice has refused to prosecute broadcasters of givea-
ways, though FCC has urged such action. 37 GEo. L. J. at 332 (1949).
14. See last sentence of opinion.
1. "Every person who, having taken an oath or affirmation before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, . . . that he will testify, . . . truly, . . . wilfully
and contrary to such oath or affirmation states or subscribes any material matter
which he does not believe to be true, shall be guilty of perjury. . . ." D. C. CODE, tit.
22, § 2501 (1940).
2. 171 F. 2d 1004 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
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Petitioner contended that evidence could be submitted at trial to con-
tradict the official record and prove that when the alleged perjury was
committed, the statutory requirement of a competent tribunal3 was not
met, because of the non-existence of a quorum at that moment. The Con-
stitution provides that a majority of the House shall constitute a quorum
to do business, but it provides further that the House shall determine
its own rules and procedures.4 The parliamentary practice of the House,
as established by its rules and precedents, is that a quorum is presumed
to exist, unless a roll call or division indicates the contrary,5 and that
business transacted prior to such a determination is not subject to chal-
lenge on that score. 6  Congressional committees generally follow House
procedure, except that by custom the roll call must disclose the existencq
of a quorum at the commencement of each session, but the quorum need
not continue every minute.7  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
it will not allow outside evidence to contradict or impeach an authenti-
cated record of the legislative body.8
Since in the instant case the record clearly showed that a quorum was
present and no objection was raised by the petitioner at the session, the
majority holding, allowing the subsequent questioning of the competency
of the tribunal, is contra to existing law and custom. The dissenting jus-
tices envisage the possible effect of the decision upon the relation between
the Court and Congress.9 They fear that any action taken or legislation
passed without a record vote would be subject to invalidation,' ° thus con-
travening the Constitution, which requires a record vote only under cer-
tain conditions." It is doubtful, however, that such a broad interpretation
of the majority view will be attempted. Rather, it will probably be limited
to criminal cases affecting the rights of witnesses who could not reason-
ably be charged with knowledge of parliamentary practice.' 2 Such an
application would still place an onerous burden upon committees in requir-
ing them to be able to refute trial court testimony by substantiating at a
later date the existence of a quorum at any particular time during the
hearing. Justification for this departure from previously established cus-
tom and law should hinge on the protection of fundamental rights. In
this case, no such rights were jeopardized by the committee's method of
determining the existence of a quorum, particularly since the witness was
under oath and knew that the committee was functioning in formal ses-
sion. Therefore, it appears that the Court may have used this oppor-
3. See note 1 supra.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Aar. I, § 5.
5. 8 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE or REPRESENTATIVES 2222.
6. 4 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HousE oF REPRESENTATIVES 2927.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892) (an enrolled act properly authenticated
is sufficient evidence of itself that it passed Congress). United States v. Ballin, 144
U. S. 1 (1892) (the presence of a quorum having been determined in accordance with
a valid rule of the House, and a majority of that quorum having voted in favor of
a bill, the bill legally passed the House, and the law is beyond challenge).
9. Instant case at 92.
10. The perjury statute under which the indictment of this case was drawn was
passed without a record vote by the Senate, 34 CONG. REc. 3496-97 (1901), and by
the House without a record vote, 34 CONG. REc. 3586 (1901). The Judicial Code,
the source of the Court's authority to review the conviction, was passed by the Senate
without a record vote. 94 CONG. REc. 7930 (1948), motion to reconsider withdrawn.
94 CONG. RZc. 8297 (1948), and by the House without a record vote, 94 CONG. RFC.
8501 (1948).
11. U. S. CONST. ART. I, §§ 5, 7 (requires a record vote at the desire of one-fifth
of those present and on the question of overriding a Presidential veto).
12. Instant case at 88.
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tunity to reflect its own and the public's indignant reaction against the
high-handed procedures followed by various congressional committees in
the conduct of their investigations.'3 Assumption of such a role by the
Court seems to be an unjustifiable encroachment by the judiciary into the
legislative field. Presumably, modification of committee rules 14 and
changes in Court personnel 15 may serve as a basis for the Court's negativ-
ing the impact of the decision. Until such time, however, the committees
must accept the added responsibility thrust upon them, a difficult and time-
consuming task, apparently unwarranted by the facts of this case.
Contempt--Baltimore "Gag" Rule-Conflict Between Freedom
of Speech and Right of Accused to a Fair Trial-Three radio
stations broadcast news dispatches concerning the confession and previ-
ous convictions of an accused in custody on a charge of murder. They
were cited and found guilty of contempt for violating a rule of court which
prohibited the publication in Baltimore of information prejudicial to a
fair trial.' On appeal, judgment was reversed since the utterances did
not constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of jus-
tice or the right to a fair trial. Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67
A. 2d 497 (Md. 1949).
Early cases in the field of contempts by publication, i. e., pul~lications
tending to interfere with the administration of justice, always regarded
liberty of the press as being subordinate to the independence of the ju-
diciary.2 The power to punish summarily for such contempts was said to
be "inherent" to the courts.3 While legal scholars have shown that this
power was derived from an unsupported dictum, 4 it may nevertheless be
regarded as "inherent" since constant usage has embedded it in our judicial
system. Abuses of this power by the courts, magnified by public reaction,
led to statutory restriction of its use in most states.5 Many of the limita-
tions, however, were defeated by, the courts on the ground that the legis-
13. N. Y. Times. Jan. 1. 1949. p. 5, col. 6 (introduction of bill to reform pro-
cedures of investigating committees); N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1949, § 1, p. 41, col. 3
(attack on procedures of committees).
14. Ibid.
15. On Oct. 1, 1949, Justice Murphy, who delivered the majority opinion in this
case, and justice Rutledge, who concurred therein, were no longer on the Court be-
cause of their deaths.
1. Rule 904, Supreme Bench of Baltimore City.
2. Independent Pub. Co. v. United States, 240 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1917); State
v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 AtI. 1057 (1908); Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Common-
wealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 449 (1899).
3. An example is Ex parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625, 635 (1859): ". . the right
of punishing contempts by summary conviction is inherent in all courts of justice.
and is essential for their protection and existence."
4. The power to punish summarily for constructive contempts has been traced to
an unsupported dictum in a cause never finally adjudicated. Its inclusion in BLAcK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES led to its adoption by the states. Almon v. The King (1765) ;
in WILMOT, NoTsS AND OPINIONS OF JUDGEMENTS 243 (1802); see Fox, CONTEMPT
OF COURT 5 (1927) ; Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 HARv.
L. REv. 1010 (1927) ; Nelles and King, Contenpts by Publication, 28 COL. L. REv. 401
(1928); but see 4 BL. Comm. *284 et seq.
5. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 2041 et seq. (Purdon, 1930); N. Y. JuD. LAW
§§750, 753; N. Y. PEN. LAW § 600; MD. CODE, Art. 26, § 4 (1939). Other state stat-
utes are given in Nelles and King. supra at 554. For details of the abuses by the
courts, see STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833) ; Nelles and
King, supra at 422.
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lature may not abrogate a power "inherent" in the judicial system. 6
Remedial legislation also restricted the use of this summary power by the
federal courts to contempts "in their presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice." 7 This limitation was enforced
strictly by the courts 8 until the Toledo case when the "so near as" clause
was interpreted to have a causal rather than a geographical meaning.9 This
case held that a publication was punishable as contempt if it had a "rea-
sonable tendency" to affect the administration of justice. Shortly there-
after, the Supreme Court was persuaded to include freedom of speech and
of the press as a "liberty" within the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.Y0 As a result of this trend in expansion of freedom, the Supreme
Court held in Bridges v. California that freedom of speech or of the press
will not be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice."' Furthermore, the degree of imminence must be
extremely high.' 2 Later cases firmly establish that whenever freedom of
speech and the administration of justice are in conflict, the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test will be employed.
13
The instant case is the first under the "clear and present danger"
doctrine in which the right to an impartial jury was involved. All previ-
ous cases under this doctrine concerned publications directed toward the
bench.' 4 The effect of this decision is to void completely any power the
court had in the field of contempts by publication. The zone of the court's
power to insure the accused a fair trial is thus restricted to the courtroom.
Although some protection may be accorded by indictment or civil suit, for
the most part, whether or not there is to be "trial by newspaper" will
depend upon the degree of restraint that the publishers impose upon
themselves.
Criminal Law-Conviction for Stealing and Receiving the Same
Goods-Defendant agreed to assist two other men in stealing goods
from a government warehouse. According to plan he received the stolen
6. See Nelles and King, spra note 4 at 554, for a tabulation of the effects given
to different state statutes; In re Opinion of the Justices, 314 Mass. 767, 782, 49 N. E.
2d 252, 261 (1943) : ". . . the Legislature has no authority to abrogate such power
or to render it inoperative."
7. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 385 (1940). When first enacted in 1831,
this statute was adapted from the N. Y. and Pa. statutes.
8. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U. S. 1874). See Nye v. United States,
313 U. S. 33, 48 (1940).
9. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 240 Fed. 849 (9th Cir. 1917), over-
ruled by Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1940).
10. See Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925). Compare the
Gitlow case with Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1905). A by-product of
enforcing the First Amendment freedoms against the states has been that the Court
is now for the first time enforcing them against the federal government also; see
Green. The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rkqhts, and the States, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rav.
608 (1949) ; Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amemdment, 27 WAsH. U. L. Q. 497, 536
(1942).
11. 314 U. S. 252 (1941) (publication of telegram declaring decision of labor
dispute outrageous and threatening strike held not to be a "clear and present danger"
to the administration of justice).
12. Ibid.
13. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946) (editorials and cartoons crit-
icizing delays of law by judges in a criminal case held not to be a "clear and present
danger") ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947) (publications criticizing judge for
taking case from jury is not a "clear and present danger"). The test seems to be
subjective and it appears that this phrase is used merely to rationalize a judgment in
favor' of freedom of speech.
14. See notes 11 and 13, supra.
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goods several blocks from the scene. He was indicted for both aiding
and abetting in the larceny of United States property, and receiving this
property knowing it to have been stolen.' His convictions on both counts
were affirmed on appeal. Aaronson v. United States, 175 F. 2d 41 (4th
Cir. 1949).
Larceny and receiving stolen goods are alternative offenses, i. e., the
application of one logically excludes the application of the other to the same
factual situation.2 Thus, a thief who gains possession by the caption and
asportation necessary for larceny cannot be guilty as a receiver since he
cannot receive what he already has. However, while most courts also
hold that a principal in the second degree cannot be convicted as a re-
ceiver,3 it appears that an accessory can.4  The courts rationalize that
since an accessory did not take part in the caption and asportion, he can
receive the stolen goods from another. Oddly enough, the presence of a
statute making all second degree principals and accessories principals in
the first degree has made little difference here, since the courts have merely
looked behind the statute to the common law in order to interpret it.5 This
emasculation was necessitated by the situation wherein the defendant was
charged with receiving stolen goods and sought to escape conviction on the
theory that the statute made him a principal in the larceny.6
The court in the instant case seemed to rely on the theory of these
earlier cases. The result achieved seems unfortunate. It creates an
anomalous situation in which the court used the statute to treat the de-
fendant, an accessory at common law, as a principal to the larceny; but
for the purpose of convicting him for receiving the goods, the court dis-
cards the statute and looks behind it to the common law. Furthermore,
it twists the purpose and policy behind the statutes which make receiving
stolen goods a criminal offense. Such conduct was afforded penal sanction
to protect property, not by inflicting dual punishment upon a thief, but
by reaching those whom larceny could not reach.7 Since the defendant
was found to have committed larceny, further punishment for receiving
stolen goods does not seem justified.8 Moreover, the defendant is exposed
to a greater punishment than the thieves themselves. If the defendant had
joined in the caption and asportion, conduct of a concededly more anti-
social nature,9 he would have been liable only for larceny. Finally, by
inflicting dual punishment for what seems to be a single offense the court
is exceeding the legislative mandate which carefully defines limitations
which can be imposed for the commission of a given crime.
1. Defendant vas indicted under 35 STAT. 555 (1908), as amended, 18 U. S. C.
§82 (Suop. 1948); 35 STAT. 1152 (1909). as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 550 (Supp.
1948) ; and 18 STAT. 479 (1909), as amended 18.U. S. C. § 101 (Supp. 1948).
2. Kirschheimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 YA.LE L. J. 513
(1949).
3. See, e. fl., State v. Keithley, 83 Mont. 177, 271 Pac. 452 (1928) ; Byrd v.
State, 117 Tex. Crim. Rep. 489, 38 S. W. 2d 332 (1931) ; 2 BIsHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
§1140 (9th ed. 1923).
4. See, e. q., State v. Webber, 112 Mont. 224, 116 P. 2d 679 (1941) ; Smith v.
State, 59 Ohio St. 350. 62 N. E. 826 (1898) ; Jenkins v. State, 62 Wis. 49, 21 N. W.
232 (1885).
5. See, e. .q., Weisberg v. United States, 258 Fed. 284 (D. C. Cir. 1919) ; State
v. Webber, supra.
6. There is a paucity of cases directly in point. One is Reg. v. Hughes, 169
Eng. Rep. 1245 (1860). For an analogous case see Carroll v. Sandford, 167 F. 2d
878 (5th Cir. 1948).
7. See Smith v. State, supra; State v. Honig, 78 Mo. 249 (1883).
8. Kirschheimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 521.
9. In the Federal Code the punishment for larceny, is double that given to re-
ceiving stolen goods.
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Criminal Law-Mistake of Law as a Defense When Defend-
ant Diligently Attempts to Ascertain the Law-Defendant, a resi-
dent of Delaware, obtained a divorce in Arkansas. Both before winning
the decree and after his return to Delaware, he was advised by com-
petent counsel that his divorce would be valid in Delaware. Relying on
this, he remarried and thereafter was indicted for bigamy. In reversing
his conviction the court held that the Arkansas divorce was invalid, but
that the accused should be allowed his defense of mistake of law, although
such a defense was not among those listed in the bigamy statute. Long v.
State, 65 A. 2d 489 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1949).
As a general rule it is said that a mistake of fact which absolves the
accused of criminal intent is a defense to criminal liability.1 With certain
exceptions, 2 a mistake of law is not.3 As a practical matter it is often
difficult to determine whether a mistake be one of fact or law. More-
over, either type of mistake may operate to negative mens rea.4 Yet the
rule, that ignorance of the law is no excuse, has been rigidly followed in
criminal cases." Social necessity is its rationale. If ignorance did excuse,
the more ignorant would be the more free to commit crimes.6 Moreover
it has been argued that to allow such a defense would raise difficult prob-
lems in judicial administration because the jury would have to inquire
too deeply into the subjective mental state of the accused.7 The fore-
going principles have been applied to the crime of bigamy, where the
requisite mens rea is the intent to commit the act which the law forbids.8
A mistake of law which induced the act of remarriage has never been
recognized as a defense in most jurisdictions, even if the mistake was
caused by advice of counsel or a public official.9 While the results of
such a rule seem harsh, 10 only a few authorities have urged that a dis-
tinction be drawn between the defendant who acts in total ignorance or
neglect of the law, and the one who diligently seeks to ascertain and obey
1. State v. McDonald, 7 Mo. App. 510 (1879); State v. Nash, 88 N. C. 497
(1883); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 35
(1939).
2. The exceptions: crimes involving a specific intent, and statutory crimes where
it is required that the defendant "knowingly" or "willfully" commit the act. Murdock
v. United States, 290 U. S. 389 (1933) ; Haigler v. United States, 172 F. 2d 986 (10th
Cir. 1949) ; Lewis v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. Rep. 582, 64 S. W. 2d 972 (1933).
3. Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877) ; State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 Atl. 1
(1935) ; Perkins, mpra, note 1 at 35.
4. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HAzv. L. REv. 75, 92
(1922).
5. Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 CHi. L. REv. 641 (1941)
traces the origin and development of the rule. Courts have generally used the terms
"ignorance of the law" and "mistake of law" interchangeably, though actually it would
seem that the former expression implies a complete want of knowledge while the latter
implies an erroneous conclusion based on some knowledge.
6. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
7. 1 AUSTin, JURisPRUDENcE 498 (1869).
8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878) ; Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D.
168, 16 Cox Crim. C. 629 (1889).
9. Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185, 49 S. W. 821 (1899) ; Ellison v. State, 100 Fla.
736, 129 So. 887 (1930) ; People v. Spoor, 235 Ill. 230, 85 N. E. 207 (1908) ; State v.
Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896) ; Mendrano v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep.
214, 22 S. W. 684 (1893) ; State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 Pac. 375 (1926).
10. State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) ; Eldridge v. State, 126 Ala. 63, 28
So. 580 (1899).
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the law, but acts under a misconception of it." The instant case recog-
nizes these two categories of mistake of law and permits the defense under
the latter set of facts.
Here defendant misapplied the law to his situation. He thought that
both his divorce and remarriage were legal. His mental attitude would
have been no different if his mistake had been one of fact; for instance,
if he thought his first wife dead. In both cases, had the belief been true,
there would have been no criminality. Far different is the case of the
person who acts in total ignorance of the law of bigamy because the latter
has no knowledge from which to form the conclusion that his act is
lawful. Again, in the instant case, if the defendant can show he was dili-
gent, then acquittal will not reward ignorance, for by hypothesis defend-
ant must have attempted to learn the law. Moreover, under this de-
cision, the issues to be posed to the jury, whether he was diligent and
whether he acted in good faith, present few difficulties because an objective
test can be applied. Thus, logically, in this case, mistake of law is as
good a defense as a mistake of fact and the rationale for withholding this
defense no longer exists.
Evidence-Admissibility of Previous Indecent Exposure in Prose-
cution for Statutory Rape-Indicted for statutory rape, defendant
on cross-examination denied that he had ever exposed himself. Over
objection, two witnesses testified that the defendant had indecently ex-
posed himself to a third party within two weeks of this alleged offense.
The Superior Court reversed the conviction because the evidence disclosed
an unrelated crime, and the witness' credibility was attacked on a collateral
issue.' The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding the evidence
of exposure admissible as tending to show the defendant's design to com-
mit the offense charged. Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A. 2d
348, 1949.
Generally, courts exclude evidence that a defendant committed crimes
or offenses independent of the one for which he is being tried.2 However,
if defendant's similar offenses reasonably tend to establish his design to
commit the particular offense charged, they are admissible under a well-
recognized exception. 3 Because of their prejudicial character the criterion
for admissibility of such offenses is not their similarity, but their logical
tendency to establish a design. 4 In rape prosecutions, some courts have
admitted defendant's similar offenses committed upon those other than the
prosecutrix as tending to show his design to commit the offense charged, 5
although the great weight of authority is otherwise.6 While design and
*11. Squire v. State 46 Ind. 459 (1874) ; see State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 712, 31
So. 300, 303 (1902). Keedy, supra note 4, at 95; Stumberg, Mistake of Law in Texas,
15 TEXAS L. RB-v. 287, 299 (1937).
1. 163 Pa. Super. 408, 62 A. 2d 73 (1948).
2. Shaffner v. Corn., 72 Pa. 60 (1872) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 343
(11th ed. 1935).
3. E. g., People v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901) ; 1 WHARTON,
op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 345, 352 (11th ed. 1935).
4. State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245 (1876) ; Com. v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 169 At].
564 (1933) ; 2 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300 304 (3d ed. 1940).
5. State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P. 2d 115 (1948) ; Dorsey v. State, 204 Ga.
345, 49 S. E. 2d 886 (1948).
6. See United States v. Lovely, 169 F. 2d 386, 390, 391 (4th Cir. 1948).
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disposition 7 are not synonymous,8 some courts ignore the distinction and
admit defendant's similar offenses upon others as tending to establish his
disposition toward the prosecutrix.9 The instant case, one of first im-
pression for this court,10 aligns Pennsylvania with those jurisdictions which
admit evidence of similar offenses committed on others as reasonably tend-
ing to establish a design. This decision, however, expands "similar
offenses" within the rule beyond the limitations heretofore imposed. The
court disposes of the distinctions between various sexual crimes as being
a matter of degree, and admits in evidence an offense dissimilar to the
crime charged, as a sexual offense reasonably tending to establish the de-
fendant's design to commit the particular sexual crime charged.
Had the court recognized the validity of medico-legal authorities in re
the characteristics of an exhibitionist,1 especially the repetitious nature of
the perversion, the evidence logically could not have been admitted as
an offense tending to show a design to commit statutory rape. By thus
ruling that evidence of a sexual abnormality, i. e. perversion, establishes
a design 12 to commit an abnormal sexual offense, the court has declared
all sexual offenses similar crimes-thereby greatly facilitating the prosecu-
tion of sexual offenders. This expansion of design seems inconsistent
with the general policy to exclude evidence having no other tendency than
to disclose a defendant's general depravity or propensity to commit crime.
Fraud-Perjured Testimony as Ground of Collateral Attack on
Fraudulent Judgment-Defendant landlady demanded possession of
the premises from plaintiff tenants, representing that she required them
for her own personal use and occupancy. Subsequently, she obtained a
judgment of dispossession on the basis of such alleged requirement, one
of the grounds for eviction specified by the Housing and Rent Control Acts
of 1947 and 1948.1 The tenants brought this action, alleging that the
landlady's representations were fraudulent. The court held that the fraudu-
lently obtained judgment did not preclude plaintiffs from maintaining the
instant action. Lyster v. Berberich, 65 A. 2d 632 (N. J. Super., App.
Div., 1949).2
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of
issues included in judgments procured by fraud has been contingent upon
the differentiation between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" frauds. A fraud
7. "In prosecution for sexual offenses, however, there is a well established excep-
tion, the theory of which is that as the mental disposition of the defendant at the time
of the act charged is relevant, evidence that at some prior time he was similarly dis-
posed is also relevant. Evidence of prior acts between the same parties is admissible
as showing a disposition to commit the act charged, the probabilities being that the
emotional predisposition or passion will continue." Hodge v. United States, 126 F. 2d
849 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
8. 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 4, §§ 399, 402.
9. State v. Funk, 154 Kan. 300, 118 P. 2d 562 (1941) ; see Bracey v. United Stateg,
143 F. 2d 85, 88 (D. C. Cir. 1944).
10. See Com. v. Winter, 289 Pa. 284, 290, 137 Atl. 261, 264 (1927).
11. ". . the history of pure exhibitionism in degenerates, that in which the ex-
posure of the genital organs . . . constitutes the entire morbid act and is the su-
preme goal of the impulse." THOINOT, MFDICOLEGAL MORAL OFFENsEs 375 (1916).
"The personality of these individuals is characteristic. There is little evidence of
aggressive tendencies, and the men tend to be shy and timid." BRANHAM & KUTASH,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY 307 (1949).
12. Query if it even establishes a disposition.
1. 61 STAT. 193 (1947) and 62 STAT. 93 (1948), 50 U. S. C. Supp. II, § 1899(a)2
(1949).
2. Accord, Williams v. DeFabio, 65 A. 2d 858 (N. J. Super. App. Div., 1949).
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committed by perjury,s or by a false instrument, 4 for example, is termed
intrinsic and the issues will not be relitigated in a collateral proceeding,
unless there are additional circumstances tending to show extrinsic fraud.5
However, a fraud committed by inducing one's opponent not to plead valid
defenses," or not to answer the complaint,7 or by failing to notify inter-
ested parties of the pendency of a suit,s is labeled extrinsic and the issues
may be relitigated. 9 In the instant factual situation, since the landlord
was usually the sole source of knowledge as to his good faith in the
dispossession proceeding, an evicted tenant's only remedy upon subse-
quently discovering the perjury was to attempt an action for fraud. Such
action was usually unsu~cessful, either on the ground that the fraud was
intrinsic,10 or that the statutes provided no remedy to the wrongfully
dispossessed tenant," or both.1 2 The court in the instant case relied upon
Alabiso v. Schuster,13 which held that since the tenant had no source of
evidence to contradict that of the landlord's good faith, the fraud, having
operated to prevent a real trial on that issue, was really extrinsic. That
court added that the obtaining of the eviction certificate was only "one step
in the perpetration of the over-all fraud" and that the attack is on the
"fraudulent means of securing the judgment," not on the judgment itself.
14
In that case, however, there was only the OPA hearing and not a judg-
ment of dispossession, as there was in the instant case. In a subsequent
New York case, 15 there was a judgment of dispossession entered, and
the court reached the same result, adopting the reasoning of the dictum
in the Alabiso case, adding that the maintenance of the action depends
upon events that took place after the judgment, i. e., the failure of the
landlord to occupy the premises in pursuance of his alleged intention.' 6
The result obtained in the instant case is realistic and equi-
table, for it is obvious that there never was a real trial upon the issue of
3. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Jenkins, 91 F. 2d 183 (8th Cir. 1937) ; Crouse v.
McVickar. 207 N. Y. 213, 100 N. E. 697 (1912) ; State v. Wright, 56 S. W. 2d 950
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
4. U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878) (leading case on intrinsic fraud).
5. E. g., Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Super. 121, 183 Atl. 371 (1936) (jurisdiction of
court fraudulently obtained) ; El Reno Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 41 Okla. 297, 137
Pac. 700 (1913) (Insured removed articles from state which were allegedly destroyed
in fire, leading insurance company to defend on an entirely different theory). See also
Note, 126 A. L. R. 390 (1940).
6. Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 Pac. 78 (1907).
7. Bullard v. Zimmerman, 82 Mont. 434, 268 Pac. 512 (1928).
8. McGuinness v. Superior Ct., 196 Cal. 222, 237 Pac. 42 (1925) ; Frisbie v. Chase,
161 Iowa 133, 140 N. W. 842 (1913).
9. See U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 65 (1878) ; Dockery v. Cent. Ariz.
Light & Power Co., 45 Ariz. 434, 450, 45 P. 2d 656, 662 (1935). See also Note, 88
A. L. R. 1201 (1934).
10. Goetz v. Doody, 190 Misc. 574, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 890 (City Ct. 1947) ; David
v. Fayman, 273 App. Div. 408, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 188 (1948),' aff'd 298 N. Y. 669, 82
N. E. 2d 404 (1948) ; 524 East 73rd St. Garage v. Pantex Mills, 274 App. Div. 617,
86 N. Y. S. 2d 305 (1949).
11. Leidy v. Connor, 70 F. Supp. 1022 (E. D. Pa. 1947) ; Gabriel v. Borowy, 85
N. E. 2d 435 (Mass. 1949).
12. Thomsen v. Texon, 189 Misc. 972, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 543 (Sup. Ct. 1947), but cf.
Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 595, 178 P. 2d 65 (1947) (recovery allowed
on ground of abuse of writ of dispossession).
13. 273 App. Div. 655, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (1948).
14. Ibid. at 658, 80 N. Y. S. 2d at 317.
15. Rubin v. Scelsi, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (N. Y. City Ct. 1948), aff'd 83 N. Y. S. 2d
477 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
16. Accord, Rosenbluth v. Sackadorf, 190 Misc. 665, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (Sup. Ct.
1947), rev'd without opinion 274 App. Div. 794, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 524 (1948), reversal
aff'd, 298 N. Y. 761, 89 N. E. 2d 158 (1948).
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the landlady's good faith, nor could- there have been. It is of course
not to be implied from the use of the court's label "extrinsic fraud" that
perjury occurring at the trial shall always be a ground for relitigation of
the issues in a collateral proceeding, in other factual situations. Prob-
ably the most consistent way of expressing the legal conclusion is to recog-
nize that any fraud committed in obtaining a judgment should be suffi-
cient to sustain an action for deceit, or an action to set it aside, except
where the defrauded party had a real and adequate opportunity to litigate
the issues in the first proceeding. Such a principle would obviate the
necessity of resorting to fine delineations and distinctions between ex-
trinsic and intrinsic frauds,17 or to rationalizations such as the courts enun-
ciated in the dicta in the Alabiso and the Rubin cases.
18
Judicial Review-Review of Interstate Commerce Commission
Order Denying Reparations-The United States brought suit to
set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission 1 denying an
award of reparations to the Government as a shipper. On appeal from
a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds,2 the Supreme Court, three jus-
tices dissenting,3 held that Section Nine of the Interstate Commerce
Act 4 does not preclude judicial review of the Commission's denial of a
shipper's reparation claim. United States v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 337 U. S. 426 (1949).
While federal district courts have jurisdiction of actions to set aside
Interstate Commerce Commission orders, 5 prior to this case the Supreme
Court has held orders of the Commission denying reparation claims non-
reviewable.6 This finality of an administrative determination adverse to
the shipper was based on both the negative order doctrine 7 and the elec-
17. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399, 421 (1923), "We
do not find ourselves obliged to enter upon a consideration of the sometimes nice dis-
tinctions made between intrinsic and extrinsic frauds in the application of the rule,
because in any case to justify the setting aside of a decree for fraud whether extrinsic
or intrinsic, it must appear that the fraud charged really prevented the party complain-
ing from making a full and fair defense."
18. See note 15 supra.
1. United States v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 269 I. C. C. 141 (1947).
2. The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Government
could not maintain a suit against itself. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that this
case involved a justiciable controversy and therefore did not come within the estab-
lished principle that no person may sue himself. 337 U. S. 426, 430 (1949).
3. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Bur-
ton joined, dissented.
4. 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 29 U. S. C. §9 (1946). "Any person . . . claiming to
be damaged by any common carrier . . . may either make complaint to the commis-
sion . . . or may bring suit . . . for the recovery of damages . . . in any
district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person shall not
have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one
of the two methods of procedure herein provided he . . . will adopt."
5. 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (1948).
6. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931) ; Brady v. United
States, 283 U. S. 804 (1931) ; Allison & Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 546 (1935),
afflrming 12 F. Supp. 862 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) ; Ashland Coal & Ice Co. v. U. S., 325
U. S. 840 (1945), affirming 61 F. Supp. 708 (E. D. Va. 1945).
7. The "negative-order" doctrine was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Proc-
tor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912). The Court declined to
review so-called negative orders, where the Commission declined to act within the
area of its discretion, and therefore a shipper might not have a review of a dismissal
of his complaint. 2 SHARFMAN, INTERSTATE Commaaca CommissioN 406-417 (1931).
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tion of remedies required by Section Nine.8  Following repudiation of the
doctrine that courts were without jurisdiction to review negative orders, 9
the Supreme Court once again denied review.10 They read Section Nine
to mean that when a shipper elects to make a complaint to the Commis-
sion rather than sue for damages in a district court, the claimant "...
shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies" "--hence no re-
view of an order denying reparations. In the instant case the Court in-
terprets the section so that it merely controls the forum in which repara-
tion claims may be initiated and tried to judgment or order. The shipper,
having elected to make complaint to the Commission, is precluded from
initiating a Section Nine proceeding in district court, but this election no
longer in itself gives finality to a Commission order.
Until this decision a shipper has been unable to recover if the Com-
mission decided against him, but a carrier had full right to review if the
award was unfavorable. 12 The Court will no longer read into Section
Nine a Congressional intent to guarantee railroads complete judicial re-
view of adverse reparation orders while denying shippers any review at
all.'3 This decision rejects a contention for administrative finality which
would have the Commission's denial of a reparation claim unreviewable
no matter how arbitrary, capricious, or illegal the agency's action.14 The
Court is unwilling to impinge on the considered opinion of the agency in
those administrative determinations requiring peculiar technical knowledge
and experience. But since the Commission adjudicates the property rights
of shipper and carrier, a concern for due process must be balanced against
the need for effective administrative regulation. Therefore, the Court holds
these orders, like other orders of the Commission, reviewable only if the
Commission has exceeded its lawful powers.15 Moreover, the Court de-
nies that the Commission award is final under Section Nine because the
primary jurisdiction doctrine 16 gives no actual right of election between
the Commission and the Court. Where a shipper's claim involves a ques-
tion of "reasonableness" calling for the exercise of administrative discre-
tion it is primarily within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Since the
Government's complaint against the carrier alleged unreasonable and dis-
crir inatory charges 17 the primary jurisdiction doctrine was applicable and
8. See note 6 supra.
9. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939). This opin-
ion stated that the Standard Oil case was not overruled in its holding that orders dis-
missing reparation claims were not reviewable because of § 9. Id. at 140, n. 23.
10. Ashland Coal & Ice Co. v. United States, 325 U. S. 840 (1945), afflirming 61
F. Supp. 708 (E. D. Va. 1945). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court with-
out argument or opinion, citing pages of the Standard Oil opinion supporting an
interpretation of § 9 as precluding review.
11. See note 4 supra.
12. 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (1948); 34 STAT. 590, as amended
36 STAT. 554, 49 U. S. C. § 16(2) ; Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S.
412, 430 (1915).
13. 337 U. S. 426, 435 (1949). For a suggestion that members of Congress inter-
preted the section as precluding review to the shipper who elected to complain to the
Commission, see 18 CONG. REc. 840 (1887).
14. Id. at 433.
15. Abuse of discretion and arbitrary action are illegal and reviewable. See I. C.
C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91 (1913).
16. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U, S. 426 (1906).
17. 337 U. S. 426, 437 (1949). The Government"s complaint before the Com-
mission asked it to find unreasonably discriminatory the refusal of railroads to make
the Government an allowance for wharfage and handling incident to shipside receipt
and delivery where the Government was performing the wharfage service for itself.
RECENT CASES
the Government could not have filed an original complaint requesting dam-
ages in a district court. The holding in this case may be narrowed to allow
review only where the primary jurisdiction rule applies. If so, the Com-
missioners' decision will be reviewable when involving the exercise of their
peculiar expertness yet final when only a judicial determination (not in-
volving a question of reasonableness) is made. There seems no basis in
Section Nine for such a distinction. The Court's reading of Section Nine
as not precluding judicial review is valid whether or not the controversy
is within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission; the considerations
impelling review of Commission orders remain in non-primary jurisdiction
cases. It would seem wise to abandon any such distinction and allow a
review of all orders denying repardtion claims where abuse of discretion
or illegal action is charged.18
Labor Law-Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Stat-
ute-The defendant union struck in violation of a statute providing
for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in public utilities.' In a suit
by the state seeking a declaratory judgment, the act's constitutionality was
upheld.2 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the decision and held that
the act represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in
that it failed to provide an adequate standard to guide the arbitration board.
State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation of New Jersey, 66 A. 2d
616 (N. J. L., Sup. Ct., 1949).
Compulsory arbitration legislation has been frequently proposed as a
solution for labor disputes in which the public has a direct interest. The
operation of such statutes has led to opposition on the part of both labor 8
and management. 4  The testing of the acts seems to have followed a set
pattern. The cycle was begun when the Supreme Court declared a Kansas
statute void as an unconstitutional use of the state's police power as ap-
plied to the food manufacturing industry which, the court decided, did
not involve the public interest.6 Subsequent statutes avoided this obstacle
by limiting compulsory arbitration to labor disputes in public utilities.8
When these acts were attacked, broad and fundamental issues were raised
involving the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
and similar provisions of state constitutions, 7 but the courts avoided them
18. The one case since United States v. I. C. C. (decided June 20, 1949) involv-
ing review of a denial of a reparation claim by the Commission allowed the review.
Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 1530 (1949). But the Court's
reversal of the district court without opinion for the reasons given in the instant case
does not clarify the extent to which review will be given since the primary jurisdiction
rule would likewise apply to the factual situation in the subsequent case (the shipper's
complaint to the Commission was based on a claim that special transit tariffs rather
that commercial freight rates charged for iron and steel shipments were applicable).
1. N. J. STAT. ANN., tit. 34, c. 13-B (Supp. 1948).
2. Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Workers, 142 N. J. Eq. 785, 61 A. 2d 570 (Ch.
1948).
3. Green, Compulsory Arbitration, American Federationist, April 1947, p. 13.
4. NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF MANUFACTURERS, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
(1947).
5. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522
(1923).
6. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 213.1 et seq. (Purdon, Supp. 1948) ; IND. STAT.
ANN., tit. 40, § 2401 et seq. (Burns, Supp. 1949) ; Wis. STAT. § 111.50 et seq. (1947).
7. The most frequently raised constitutional issues have been due process, equal
protection of laws, involuntary servitude, and freedom of speech.
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and invalidated the statutes on less controversial grounds. 8 The original
test of the New Jersey legislation was the first decision to face directly
the basic questions involving the Federal Constitution and at the same time
introduced the problem of the delegation of power. The trial court up-
held the act on both grounds. The decision in the instant case, the first
handed down by a state court of last resort, upheld the compulsory arbitra-
tion provision in regard to public utilities as far as the Constitution was
concerned but then proceeded to invalidate it for failing to lay down an
adequate standard to guide the arbitration board as required by the state
constitution. The first phase of the cycle of unconstitutionality and statu-
tory revision was complete, but there is every indication that this decision
will begin a second phase which, with proper statutory reformation, 9 will
end in eventual acceptance.
The problem of setting up an adequate, intelligible standard for ar-
bitrators is a difficult one.'0 Standards may be adopted for adjusting
wages and some working conditions, but what criteria can adequately pro-
vide for the many less spectacular but important demands which arise
and may be peculiar to the dispute in question? Faced with this inherent
problem, the court voided the legislation. However, before reaching its
ultimate decision, it carefully articulated each constitutional objection and
disposed of it, thus serving notice on the legislature that a similar statute
with provision for a standard would stand up under any constitutional
objections." This dictum becomes more consequential since the court in
anticipation of statutory revision cited with approval standards established
in similar legislation of other jurisdictions. 12 The court also recognized the
need for specific standards where, as here, the arbitrators are selected
for each dispute rather than operating as a continuous administrative
body which gathers experience as it goes along. Although ad hoc arbitra-
tors attempt to reconcile what they consider a fair return for employers
and a fair wage for employees, 13 the public's interest in the dispute should
be represented by the legislative standard. Furthermore, since arbitration
boards may be subjected to political pressure and popular sentiment, a
standard would aid the court in restricting the award to the economic
issues involved in the dispute. With this decision added to the trend of
acceptance by the state courts,14 and the Supreme Court test 15 which in-
timated that compulsory arbitration in public utilities would not violate
constitutional guarantees, it would seem that the opponents of such statutes
will do better to look to the legislatures than to the courts for relief.
8. Transport Workers' Union v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N. W. 2d 71 (1948)
(violation of separation of powers by requiring circuit court judge to act as arbitra-
tor); Dairyland Power Cooperative v. Wis. Employment Relations Board, 15 CCH
Lab. Cas. 1f 64,638 (Wis. 1948) (error to rule on constitutional questions not raised by
the parties).
9. Subsequent to announcement of the instant decision, the N. J. Legislature on
June 16, 1949, enacted Ch. 308 L. 1949, which amended the original unconstitutional
statute to include factors to be considered by the arbitration board in rendering its
decisions. N. J. Laws 1949, tit. 34, c. 13-B, §§ 27, 28.
10. Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 264, 273
(1947).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 213.11 (Purdon, Supp. 1948) ; IND. STAT. ANN., tit.
40, § 2410 (Burns, Supp. 1949) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 48.818 (Supp. 1947) ; Wis. STAT.
§ 111.57 (1947).
13. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 993 (5th ed. 1941).
14. United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Board
16 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 64,905 (Wis. 1948).
15. See note 5 supra.
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Statutory Construction-Inclusion of Obscene Phonograph Rec-
ords as "Other Matter of Indecent Character"-Appellant delivered
a package of phonograph records of admittedly obscene stories to an ex-
press company for interstate shipment. He was convicted of violation of
a federal statute prohibiting the interstate shipment of any "obscene book,
pamphlet, picture, motion picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or
other matter of indecent character." 1 The court, invoking the doctrine
of ejusdern generis, held that phonograph records are not within the pur-
view of the prohibition. Alpers v. United States, 175 F. 2d 137 (9th Cir.
1949).
Under existing federal penal law it is unlawful to either mail, import,
transport, or broadcast obscenities in interstate commerce. 2  The judicial
construction of these provisions has been concerned almost entirely with
the interpretation of the term "obscene." The scope of the phrase "any
other indecent publication," as found in the postal statute has been con-
sidered in very few cases.3 It has been held not to embrace sealed letters,
the court being of the opinion that Congress had not intended to regulate
private communications.4 On the other hand, it has been indicated that
the probable intent of Congress was to include matter such as a printed
song or an engraving although they are not described by the preceding
specific words.5  A decision interpreting a similar New York statute 6 is
the only one directly in point with the principal case. It was there held
that phonograph records were included within the meaning of the words
"article or instrument" on the ground that the primary purpose of an
obscenity statute is to suppress the exploitation of smut and it would
therefore be unreasonable to limit the vehicles of contamination to those
pertaining to vision alone.7 In the instant case, however, the court ar-
rived at its decision by the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generiss
the opinion being concerned almost entirely with the formal principles of
statutory construction.
In the past, when the courts have been confronted with the problem of
defining the term "obscenity", a uniform method of treatment has obtained.
Underlying the opinions is the tacit assumption that the definition is to be
formulated in each case so as to mirror the custom of the time and the
1. 29 STAT. 512 (1897), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1462 (1948).
2. 17 STAT. 599 (1872), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1461 (1948) (mailing); 29
STAT. 512 (1897), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1462 (1948) (importing and transport-
ing) ; 48 STAT. 1096, 1100 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 1464 (1948) (broadcasting).
3. The other cases construing this phrase have been concerned with the significance
of the word "indecent."
4. United States v. Chase, 135 U. S. 255 (1890) ; United States v. Clark, 43 Fed.
574 (D. C. Iowa 1890). The statute was amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1888, ch. 1039,
§ 2, 25 STAT. 496 (1888) to include letters.
5. See United States v. O'Donnell, 165 Fed. 218, 221 (D. N. Y. 1918).
6. NEw YORK PENAL LAw § 1141(1).
7. People ex rel. Kahan v. Jaffe, 178 Misc. 523, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 104 (N. Y. City
Cts. 1942) ; cf. People v. Strassner, 87 N. E. 2d 280 (N. Y. 1949), dismissing as de-
fective an information attempting to bring obscene phonograph records within scope
of "writing" and citing principal case in support. However, the court intimated that
prosecution would lie under the clause prohibiting "articles . . . of indecent or im-
moral use."
8. "Where general words follow special words in an enumeration describing the
legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature
to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2 SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTORY CoNsTmucrioN § 4909 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
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community. 9 It is submitted that the court might well have accorded to
the construction of the phrase "other matter of indecent character" the same
treatment as is given to the interpretation of "obscene" as it appears in the
same statute.'0 Thus, by taking notice of the role of the juke box, the
automatic record changer, and the new long-playing record in modern
society and by invoking the established principle that a strict construction
should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute,"
the court could well have upheld the conviction. It is to be hoped that
the possible, and very probable, consequences of this reversal will be
brought to the attention of Congress. A pornographic writing may now be
recorded and, as a record, be shipped in interstate commerce with complete
freedom from government regulation. This is the more startling if we
place the point of origin in a state such as New Mexico which has no
obscenity statute and envisage the nation-wide distribution that might
follow.' 2 The critics of these statutes have long been clamoring for a much
needed revision.'3 This decision carried to its logical conclusion holds
that when Congress has banned traffic in a certain commodity the statute
is to be construed more strictly with respect to the container than to the
contents. It may be of material assistance in bringing about the desired
remedial action.
14
Taxation-Privilege Tax on Segment of Interstate Commerce
Measured by Apportioned Gross Receipts-Petitioner, a pipe line
company operating lines lying wholly inside Mississippi, transports oil
from fields in Mississippi to loading racks adjacent to railroads elsewhere
in the state. The railroads then carry the oil to refineries in other states.
Petitioner receives a per barrel rate from producers for its services from
field to rack. Mississippi levied a tax on pipe lines measured by two per-
cent of gross receipts for the privilege of doing business therein and exclud-
ing from taxation any portion of income derived from interstate activities.1
Petitioner contended that the tax was unconstitutional, claiming that its
9. See Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729, 730 (D. C. Cir. 1940) and the
opinion of Bok, J.. in Commonwealth v. Gordon et al., 66 D. & C. 101 (Pa. Q. S.
1949), for comprehensive discussions of the development of definitive standards of
obscenity.
10. A recent decision held that the words "photograph, picture" in the state ob-
scenity statute included motion pictures, although unknown at the time of the original
enactment in 1878, on the ground that the retention of these words in the Code of 1933
clearly indicated a legislative intent to include motion pictures as they are known to-
day. Gore v. State, 54 S. E. 2d 669 (Ga. 1949).
11. See, e. g., United States v. Gaskin, 320 U. S. 527, 529 (1944) ; United States
v. Raynor. 302 U. S. 540. 552 (1938) ; Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128
(1936) ; 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucrIox § 5606, § 7201 (3d ed., Horack,
1943) ; Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748
(1935). Contra: McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25 (1931). Criminal statutes
are to be so worded as to give fair warning as to what constitutes the proscribed con-
duct and so construed by the courts as not to nullify such warning. But see dissenting
opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Winters v. People of the State of New York, 333 U. S.
507, 534 (1948).
12. Since the states cannot exercise their power of control until arrival at destina-
tion the enforcement of the several state obscenity statutes would be greatly inhibited.
13. ERNST & SEAGLE, To TaE PuRE (Viking Press 1929); Nutting, Definitive
Standards in Federal Obscenity Legislation, 23 IowA L. REv. 24 (1937); Balter, Some
Observations Concerninq the Federal Obscenity Statutes, 8 So. CAL. L. REv. 267
(1935).
14. See ERNST, op. cit. supra, at 287, for a recommended statute.
1. Miss. CODE, tit. 40, c. 3, §§ 10105, 10109 (Supp. 1948).
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business is interstate in character and that the Federal Constitution pre-
cludes states from taxing the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
In a split decision 2 the Supreme Court, accepting the ruling of the state
court that the pipe line is an intrastate enterprise, said that a state gross
receipts tax on intra- or interstate commerce is constitutional provided it is
fairly apportioned and does not discriminate against interstate commerce
or lead to taxation of the same subject matter by other states. Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 69 Sup. Ct. 1264 (1949).
Historically, state taxes on interstate commerce 3 or for the privilege
of engaging in that commerce 4 have been declared unconstitutional. Taxes
on gross receipts of interstate enterprises were held to constitute a direct
burden on interstate commerce.5 Thus, the subject of the tax was long
given greater judicial consideration than its economic effect or method of
admeasurement.6 In 1938 there appeared a reformulation of underlying
doctrine when the so-called "cumulative burden" test was invoked by the
court.7 This doctrine, emphasizing the economic consequences of the tax,
necessarily involved apportionment since it condoned any tax provided
two or more states could not tax the same subject matter and thus submit
interstate commerce to a greater burden than intrastate commerce.8 But
this has not led to an abandonment of the "direct burden" theory. Follow-
ing an earlier case in point 9 the Court in 1947 held invalid a privilege tax:
on stevedoring measured by gross receipts, 10 although from its very nature
stevedoring could not be subject to a multiple burden. The following year,
a Mississippi "franchise" tax on an interstate pipe line 11 and a New York
state tax on gross receipts of a local bus line traversing the borders of two
other states 12 were approved under the "cumulative burden" test, thus
increasing confusion in the field. This latest decision not only sustains the
"apportionment theory," but asserts that neither the form of the tax, nor the
type of commerce-intrastate or interstate-which it affects, are relevant in
testing its validity.
2. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy joined Mr. Justice Rutledge in the opin-
ion. Mr. Justice Burton concurred. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson joined Mr. Justice Reed in dissent.
3. Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 650, 656 (1936) (gross
receipts tax on a radio station. Held, a "direct tax" on interstate commerce and there-
fore invalid) ; Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S.
217 (1908).
4. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948); Joseph v. Carter
& Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947) ; Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249
(1946) ; Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 260 U. S. 555 (1925) ; Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 U. S. 47. 56 (1891) ; cf. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R. R. Comm'rs,
332 U. S. 495, 502, 505 (1947).
5. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U. S. 90 (1937) ; Fisher's
Blend Station v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 650 (1936) ; Galveston, Harrisburg and
San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908) ; Philadelphia & So. Mail S. S.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887).
6. Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARV. L. Rxv. 501, 502
(1947).
7. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938) (tax meas-
ured by gross income of advertising received by a publication with interstate circula-
tion).
8. Mr. Justice Stone, the writer of the opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue, supra, apparently changed his beliefs, for earlier he had concurred in the
result of Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm'n, supra.
9. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U. S. 90 (1937).
10. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947). An in-
diana gross receipts tax on security brokers was also held by the Court to be a direct
burden on interstate commerce. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249 (1946).
11. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra.
12. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948).
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It would seem therefore that the only restriction remaining on the
states' power to tax in the sphere of interstate commerce would be the
test of "apportionment," e. g., whether the tax subjects interstate activities
to a multiple tax burden. With the two other recent victories of the ap-
portionment theory as background, we might optimistically predict that a
tax directly on interstate commerce and fairly apportioned to a representa-
tive segment of business done within the taxing state would meet with court
approval. But formalism is too well entrenched at present to expect a
surrender to practicality. 13 The probability is that the instant case will take
its place with the other apportionment decisions with its effect limited to
analogous factual situations. Unfortunately, further inconsistencies result-
ing from avowal of the "direct burden" doctrine seem inevitable. 4
Torts-An Unborn Child Is a Person and May Maintain an
Action for Pre-Natal Injuries-Plaintiff alleged that the negligence
of defendant transit company caused her mother to fall from the steps of
defendant's bus. The fall resulted in plaintiff's premature birth at seven
months and caused the injuries for which she now seeks redress. Defend-
ant's demurrer was sustained by the trial court on the grounds that an
unborn child has no cause of action. Judgment for the defendant was
reversed on appeal, but the case was certified to the supreme court, another
Ohio appellate court having reached the opposite result on similar facts.,
The court held that an unborn viable child is a person within the meaning
of the Ohio constitution which entitles "every person, for an injury done
[his] person to a remedy by due course of law." 2 Williams v. The
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N. E. 2d 334 (Ohio 1949).
Mr. Justice Holmes in 1884, faced with lack of precedent, held in
Deitrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton 3 that a five month foetus was part
of its mother and not a person to whom a duty of care was owed. The
great majority of courts followed Holmes' lead, giving various reasons for
denying recovery.4 Some have refused to recognize that an unborn child
is a person 5 and have failed, as did the Deitrich decision, to distinguish the
viable foetus, which is six to seven months old and capable of maintaining
an independent existence,6 from the non-viable. Others brand the doctrine
that an unborn child is a person for all purposes beneficial to it, a "mere
13. Mr. Justice Burton concurred only on the grounds that the activity involved
was intrastate commerce. This would apparently align him with members of the dis-
sent on other issues of the case.
14. In Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., mpra, at 427, Mr. Justice
Reed sanctioned non discriminatory gross receipts taxes; at 433, he declared that a tax
on gross receipts or on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce measured by
gross receipts is invalid.
1. Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N. E. 2d 421 (Ohio 1943).
2. OHio CoxsT., Art. I, § 16 (1894).
3. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
4. Contra: Bonbrest v. Kotz. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946) ; Montreal Tram-
ways, Inc. v. LeVeille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (Sup. Ct. Canada 1933) ; Kine v. Zuckerman,
4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1922). Only the Canadian case is cited in the opinion. See also
Verdennes v. Corniea, 18 LAW WEEK 2114 (Minn. 1949), which held an administrator
may maintain an action for a child that died before birth from pre-natal injury.
5. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921).
6. 3 WHARTON AND STILLES, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 38 (5th ed. 1905).
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fiction of the civil law". 7 Such courts are not persuaded by analogies to the
law of crimes and property," though it is of little solace to an abortionist
convicted of murder in a common law jurisdiction that he has killed a "mere
fiction". It is equally well established that an unborn child may take prop-
erty by will or descent. Another court balked at the difficulty of proving
causation and the possibility of fraudulent claims.9 An Irish court decided
a carrier owed a contractual duty to the pregnant mother only and thus
was not responsible for injuries to the child en ventre sa mere.10  In spite
of this array of contrary authority, the instant court dismisses the Deitrich
precedent on the ground that here the plaintiff was a viable foetus. Agree-
ing with the "civil law fiction" and persuaded by the analogies to the law
of crimes and property, the court insists that an unborn viable child is, in
the words of a much quoted dissent, "a person, and possesses the rights
that inhere to a person, though incapable of asserting them." 11 Although
the question of contractual duty owed the unborn child is ignored, the court
considers the problem of proof and the possibility of fraud to have nothing
to do with whether an unborn child has a cause of action.
Where other jurisdictions have hesitated at the hint of judicial legis-
lation, 12 the instant decision has filled an anomalous gap in the symmetry
of tort law.13  It offends common sense to deny redress should an injury
occur one minute before birth yet grant redress if the injury was received
one minute after birth. No jury aided by competent medical testimony
should be drawn in by fraudulent claims. Confronted with living evidence
of pre-natal injury this court has brought tort law up to date for the unborn
viable child. Other courts, however, faced with living evidence of a child
deformed by injuries received before it was a viable foetus,' 4 may find the
viable non-viable distinction a barrier to compensating an equally deserving
plaintiff.
Trade-Marks and Trade Names-The Test for Infringement Un-
der the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946-Plaintiff, manufacturer of
wax products, and defendants, manufacturers of household cleaner, both
use the name "Johnson" on their products. By virtue of a previous suit
between the parties,' defendant had been required to add the suffix
"Cleaner" to his brand name.2  Relying on the subsequently adopted Lan-
7. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900). A Louisiana
court has held that a viable foetus who dies a few days after birth from prenatal in-
juries has a cause of action which accrues to the parent. Cooper v. Blank, 39 So. 2d
352 (La. 1923).
8. Drobner v. Peters, supra, at 223, 133 N. E. at 569.
9. Stanford v. St. Louis, San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
10. Walker v. The Great Northern Ry., L. R. 28 Ir. 69 (1891).
11. Chief Justice Brogan in Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489
(1942).
12. Drobner v. Peters, spra, at 224, 133 N. E. at 570.
13. This decision is in accord with the unanimous clamour of text writers on the
subject. E. g., PRossER, TORTS 188 (1941).
14. Such probaby was the situation in Stemmer v. Kline, mtpra. A physician
gave plaintiff's mother X-ray treatments for a tumor. The "tumor" was born six
weeks later and survived though deaf, dumb, blind, and paralyzed. The court held it
was not entitled to maintain an action for its injuries.
1. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F. 2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940), modifying
28 F. Supp. 744 (W. D. N. Y. 1939).
2. The decree also required defendant to add in immediate juxtaposition to the
words "Johnson's Cleaner" the words "made by Johnson Products Company, Buffalo,
N. Y.," in type equally large and conspicuous.
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ham Act,3 plaintiff again sought in the instant case to enjoin the use of
the name "Johnson" completely on the ground that there was confusion
among the public as to the source of the two products. The circuit court
refused relief, holding that the mere fact of confusion did not of itself justify
an injunction. S. C. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Johnson, et al., 175 F. 2d
176 (2d Cir. 1949).
Protection against use of a similar mark on different products has been
a much disputed question. 4 In the common law action for unfair com-
petition, relief might be granted the first user of a mark against another's
passing off his product as having a common origin with the first user's
where the two products had substantially the same physical properties. 5
The Act of 1905, in establishing a federal law of trade-marks,0 adopted as
its criterion for trade-mark infringement a "same descriptive properties"
test.7 With the growth of business, whereas the statutory remedy remained
narrow,8 the action for unfair competition was extended to cover cases of
confusion of source when the products were not of the same class.9 For
example, the common law action could be invoked to protect the first user's
reputation 10 and right of expansion, 1 and to prevent free rides on his good-
3. THE TRADE-MARK AcT OF 1946, 60 STAT. 437, 15 U. S. C. § 1114(1) (1948):
"Any person who shall, in commerce, (a) use . . . any reproduction . . . or
colorable imitation of any registered mark . . . which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods
shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant."
4. For opposing views on the extent of protection that should be given, compare
Callman, Unfair Competition Without Competitionf? The Importance of the Property
Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 443 (1946) with Brown,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.
J. 1165 (1948).
5. Godillot v. American Grocery Co., 71 Fed. 873 (C. C. D. N. J. 1896), aff'd
without opinion, 79 Fed. 989 (3d Cir. 1897), cert. denied, 168 U. S. 708 (1897) ; The
Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corp.. 18 Fed. 561 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882) (axes
and shovels) ; cf. Celluloid Manufacturing Co. v. Read, 47 Fed. 712 (C. C. D. Conn.
1891) (celluloid and starch).
6. There are some doubts as to whether the Act of 1905 created a substantive
federal trade-mark law. See Rogers, The Expensive Futilit. of the United States
Trade-Mark Statute, 12 MicH. L. REv. 660 (1914).
7. 33 STAT. 728 (1905) : "Any person who shall . . . reproduce . . . or color-
ably imitate any such trade-mark and affix the same to merchandise of substantially
the same descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration . . . shall be
liable to an action for damages therefor."
8. E. g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 73 F. Supp. 74 (S. D. N. Y.
1947), mnodified on other grounds, 167 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948) (magazines and gir-
dles); Walgreen Drug Stores, Inc. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F. 2d 956 (8th
Cir. 1940), cert denied, 311 U. S. 708 (1940) ; Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard
Co., 7 F. 2d 967 (3d Cir. 1925), aff'd on other grounds, 273 U. S. 629 (1927) ; cf.
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliot, 7 F. 2d 962 (3rd Cir. 1925). But see Yale Electric
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) ; L. E. W aterman Co. v. Gordon,
72 F. 2d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1934). And see California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sun-
kist Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947), commented on in 48 COL. L. REv. 648,
649 (1948); Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trade-Mark Law, 37 COL. L. REv. 582
(1937).
9. E. g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U. S. 672 (1918) (flour and syrup) ; Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohr-
lich, supra; Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 Cir., (2d
1910); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Dunlop Lubricant Co., 16 R. P. C. 12 (Hhigh
Ct. J., Ch. Div. 1899) ; see Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliot, supra, at 966. Contra:
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co, 201 Fed. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
See Note, 148 A. L. R. 12 (1944).
10. See, e. g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316
U. S. 203, 205 (1942) ; Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, supra, at 974.
11. See, e. g., Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. 2d 822, 825
(2d Cir. 1943) ; Emerson Electric Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105
F. 2d 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 616 (1939).
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will by others,12 and, in some cases "dilution" of the uniqueness of his
mark, 13 but the act imposed an absolute liability only where the infringing
mark was used on a product of substantially the same physical proper-
ties.14 The Yale case in 192815 attempted to interpret the statutory lan-
guage to follow the Aunt Jemima decision and permit the use of a general
confusion of source test in the action for trade-mark infringement, but few
courts were willing to go so far.16
To the court, the Lanham Act, while conferring broad new rights upon
trade-mark owners,1 made the law of trade-mark protection identical with
the law of unfair competition '8 as it existed in 1946 in its. adoption of
the latter's confusion of source test in suits for trade-mark infringement.
In view of this, the court, realizing that some confusion will inevitably re-
sult whenever two persons use similar marks, declared that likelihood of
confusion is not the sole criterion. The harm that plaintiff might suffer,
both in loss of reputation and in loss of a possible area of future expan-
sion, must be weighed against defendant's interest in the use of his mark
in a non-competing field.' 9 In the present case, since there is no allega-
tion of harm resulting from the confusion, and since defendant has pre-
sumably acted in good faith, it seems inequitable to deny him the right to
do business under his own name, particularly when he has been doing
business under that name for sixteen years.20 While plaintiff may have
built up the value of its mark by extensive advertising, it should not, under
the circumstances, acquire thereby exclusive rights in "a market not its
own." The interpretation of the act to require a weighing of the parties'
interests in addition to the likelihood of confusion is a desirable one, since
the first user is adequately protected, while another may make reasonable
use of a similar mark on dissimilar products and in non-competing fields.
Trade Regulation-Constitutionality of the Fair Trade Acts-
Operating under the Florida Fair Trade Act 1 plaintiff-distilling company
published a price schedule for the state on Philadelphia Whiskey and en-
tered into resale price maintenance contracts which included the price
schedule with two retailers. Defendant, a liquor retailer, did not so con-
tract, but was informed of the schedule and the contracts. The company
12. E. q., Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F. 2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Kotabs, Inc.
v. Kotex Co.. 50 F. 2d 810 (3d Cir. 1931). cert. denied, 284 U. S. 665 (1931).
13. E. g., Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
14. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., supra, at 969: "The implication
in the statute is that a trade-mark, which is identical with a registered trade-mark
owned and in use by another, may be registered if it is not appropriated to merchan-
dise of the same class."
15. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, supra.
16. See note 8 supra.
17. See SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ; Hearings before Sub-
committee of Committee on Patents on H. R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-26 (1943).
And see 39 FORTUNE 147 (1949).
18. ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARE MANUAL 164 (1947): "The scope of the
new Act is, however broad enough to include the cases heretofore classified as 'stat-
utory' and 'common law' infringements."
19. Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., Inc., supra; Emerson Elec-
tric Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., supra.
20. Although laches were the basis of the lower court's decision in 8 F. R. D. 217
(W. D. N. Y. 1948), and were a major point in the arguments on appeal, the court
makes no technical application of the doctrine.
1. FLA. STAT. § 541.01 et seq. (1941).
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sought to enjoin defendant from selling below the scheduled price,2 but the
court quashed the injunction order and declared the Fair Trade Act un-
constitutional as an invalid use of the police power for private and not public
welfare.3 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d
371 (Fla. 1949).
At common law resale price agreements were considered contracts in
restraint of trade and therefore unenforc~able. 4 However, in 1931, Cali-
fornia gave statutory authority to enforce them in the case of branded or
trade-marked articles in open competition. 5 Other state legislation fol-
lowed, but general adoption was inhibited until the passage of the Miller-
Tydings Enabling Act which excluded such agreements from the opera-
tion of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.6 To date all but three states 7
have passed Fair Trade Acts which grant to the trade-mark or brand
name owner leave to enforce resale price agreements upon distributors
or retailers under restrictive contracts. Moreover, many states have ex-
tended this grant to include enforcement against distributors or retailers who
are merely notified of the agreements." A few state courts balked at the
law as a violation of due process, 9 but in 1936 the Supreme Court upheld a
typical statute placing emphasis upon the property interest remaining with
the owner in the good-will of the brand name or trade-mark after sale of
the product.10 Since then most state courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead,1' but Florida has been singularly unreceptive to all forms of
price-fixing,' 2 especially the Fair Trade Act.13 In keeping with this policy
the court in the instant case voided the statute directly. Relying heavily
on an FTC report 14 which showed that the Act was proposed by retailers
and worked solely to their advantage, the court found that its operation
did not result in promotion of the public welfare and hence was not a
valid exercise of the police power.'1
Resale price agreements allow the producer or distributor of a com-
modity to enforce uniformity of price at the retail level, thus precluding
price competition at that point. Classically, universal competition is a key-
stone of our society, but the hard facts of the 1930's drove the legislatures
and the courts to re-evaluate and restrict its operation in a disrupted
2. Under § 541.07: "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or sell-
ing any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pur-
suant to the provisions of this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for
sale or sellinq is or is not a partv to such contract . . . is actionable at the suit of
the person damaged thereby." (Emphasis supplied.)
3. The instant case was decided April 5. 1949. On May 20, 1949, the Florida
Legislature passed a new Fair Trade Act answering most of the court"s objections
by providing that the Attorney General may bring action to restrain performance of
any such contracts which would lessen competition. (Chapter 25,204, Florida Laws
1949.) However, petition for re-hearing was denied May 27, 1949.
4. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
5. Cal. Stats. 1931, ch. 278, § 1 et seq.
6. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §§1-7 (1940), amending 26 STAT. 209 (1890)
and 49 STAT. 1526 (1936).
7. Vermont, Texas, and Missouri.
8. E. g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 16,904 (Deering, 1944).
9. E. g., Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409
(1936).
10. Old Dearborn v. Seagram Distilleries, Inc., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
11. E.g., Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 77 N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
12. State v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 2d 394 (1936).
13. Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So. 2d .913 (1942);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
14. FTC REP. oN PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945).
15. Contra: Triner Corp. v. Carl McNeill, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936),
aff'd. 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
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economy. "Price Wars" weaken the whole economic structure, impair the
good-will in brand names built up through expensive advertising, and
diminish the return to producers and retailers below conscionable levels.
Ultimately their result may be to destroy the smaller enterprises and cre-
ate monopoly conditions for a few large and resilient corporations. To
insure stability the Fair Trade Acts and the Unfair Practices Acts 1 were
passed in most of the states. The state courts as well as the legislatures
found that conditions warranted such an exercise of the police power.
However, today those conditions have fundamentally changed. The supply-
demand balance of the '30's has been reversed, and it is under these cir-
cumstances that the instant case arose. The power of the Fair Trade Act
has been used to enforce high and unjustified prices by combinations of
retailers and wholesalers which have threatened to boycott producers who
will not publish sufficiently high price schedules. 17 In the latest comprehen-
sive study of the effects of the Act, the FTC considered it a gratuitous in-
vitation to circumvent monopoly legislation and has recommended repeal
of the Miller-Tydings Act.'8 Under present economic conditions the pub-
lic is denied the advantage of retail competition while little danger remains.
of excessive and harmful price cutting. When legislation which protects
private interests outlives its social justification the court may well find it
invalid.
16. E. g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17,000 et seq. (Deering, 1944). These acts
forbid inter alia the sale of a commodity below cost.
17. FTC. op. cit. supra note 14, at LXI. The FTC has prosecuted many such
organizations, e. g., FTC v. National Retail Package Stores Assoc., Inc., 43 F. T. C.
379 (1947).
18. FTC, op. cit. supra, at LXIV.
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